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 1. INTRODUCTION 
The recent financial crises in the United States will leave a huge hole in 
taxpayers’ pockets. The collapse of the investment banking sector and insurance 
companies, the two largest housing finance entities, and part of the auto industry has 
required an unprecedented response from the Treasury and the Federal Reserve. The cost 
of bailout programs designed to restore confidence in the economy have been estimated 
as 60 percent of gross domestic product (GDP). The magnitude of this figure—in 
conjunction with the current deficit—has overshadowed the known economic challenges 
that we face in upcoming years: namely, the imbalance in outlays and incoming revenue 
for social insurance programs (Social Security and Medicare) caused by the reduction in 
fertility and the increase in life expectancy. This is in addition to the effects on the labor 
markets. 
 The magnitude of these fiscal adjustments can assessed by looking at projected 
demographics and the distribution of the tax burden across different age cohorts; but, 
ultimately, policies must by established by considering intergenerational equity (fairness 
in taxing and benefiting different generations) and economic efficiency. 
Thus, before determining who will pay the tax bill for social insurance programs, 
how much is needed, and the best tax instruments to raise the revenue, we must 
accurately measure the tax burden or tax incidence of different individuals over time. 
This measurement then can be used to (i) identify the individuals who are currently 
bearing the cost of the tax bill and (ii) changes in the tax burden implied by alternative 
tax regimes. Our paper provides a new and simple metric to measure tax incidence across 
different age cohorts over time. 
  2The most popular approach to the measurement of generational tax incidence is 
the generational accounting framework developed by Auerback, Gokhale, and Kotlikoff 
(1991).
2 The accounting procedure requires rewriting the government’s intertemporal 
budget constraint in terms of the fiscal incidence and the transfer programs received by 
each generation. Assuming that taxes and transfers remain unchanged, these authors 
calculate the net tax burden that future generations must bear to achieve long-term 
balance in the government budget constraint. Any structural change in the tax policy must 
be captured by a change in the fiscal incidence and transfers received by each generation; 
this requirement implies a different measurement for present and future generations. 
The advantage of the accounting framework is that the tax burden is relatively 
easy to compute because it does not require specific assumptions about individual 
preferences, technology, and market structure.
3 It is sufficient to determine an 
intertemporal discount rate so the tax burden paid by future generations can be directly 
compared with the current ones. This ease of computation explains the widespread use 
for policy analysis in practice (Board of Governors, Department of the Treasury, World 
Bank) to assess the burden of future demographics or the impact of policy reforms. Two 
limitations of the generational accounting framework are that it ignores the impact of 
taxation on economic activity, and omits the welfare gains and losses resulting from 
fiscal reforms. To address these criticisms, Fehr and Kotlikoff (1996) measured the fiscal 
                                                 
2 Staff economists at the Board of Governors developed a similar approach: a stylized model to measure the 
impact of population aging on living standards measured using consumption growth. For example, 
Bernanke (2006) summarizes the findings of Elmendorf and Sheiner (2000) and Sheiner, Sichel, and 
Slifman (2006) and proposes different alternatives to deal with the demographic transition. 
 
3 Welfare analysis provides an alternative method to measure tax incidence. This approach requires specific 
assumptions about preferences and technology and is based entirely on individual optimizing behavior and 
market clearing conditions. Conesa and Garriga (2008b) use optimal fiscal policy to design the best 
possible response to demographic shocks.  
  3incidence implied by the generational accounting method in a dynamic general 
equilibrium life cycle model. They found that generational accounts match the evolution 
of welfare changes for each cohort, but err with regard to the magnitudes of the change. 
The authors argue that the bias is quantitatively small when the capital-to-output ratio 
that determines the equilibrium interest rate and wage rates changes little. 
In this paper, we show that the generational accounting framework used in 
macroeconomics to measure tax incidence can, in some cases, yield inaccurate 
measurements of the tax burden across age cohorts. This result is very important for 
policy evaluation, because it shows that the selection of tax policies designed to change 
generational imbalances could be misleading. We illustrate these issues in the context of 
tax reforms (i.e. Social Security reform, or tax substitution) where we show how fiscal 
policy can affect the intergenerational gap measured by the generational accounts without 
impacting the distribution of consumption, hours worked, and utility. Although cohort 
costs, measured via the generational accounts, are different, in terms of welfare for the 
individual they are in fact equivalent. We argue that this is a more fundamental problem 
with the measure of tax incidence proposed by Auerbach et al. (1991). 
Our paper’s main contribution is the development of a robust alternative 
measurement approach based on the same principles and equally simple in its 
implementation. To solve the aforementioned problems we base the measurement of the 
tax burden on the consumer intertemporal budget constraint and the notion of effective 
tax distortions from Ramsey taxation. This concept, instead of considering the statutory 
definition of taxes (i.e., labor income tax, consumption tax, and capital income tax), uses 
the notion of tax wedge that distorts relative prices from the marginal rate of 
  4transformation. In the absence of distortions, the value of the wedge is one and prices 
reflect the marginal rates of transformation. The measurement based on the intertemporal 
budget constraint eliminates the complication of computing the tax treatment of capital 
income taxation. This intertemporal distortion is embedded in the effective relative price 
of consumption over time. To illustrate the magnitude of the bias we use a standard life 
cycle model and compare the generational accounts implied by the baseline model with 
the ones associated with a Pareto-neutral Social Security reform (as in Conesa and 
Garriga, 2008a). We find that the bias using the measurement provided by Auerbach et 
al. (1991) is quantitatively large: The numerical simulations suggest that it can be as high 
as 15 percent across Pareto-neutral reforms and much larger compared with our 
alternative measurement procedure. We complete the analysis by providing an empirical 
illustration that compares the measurements obtained by Kotlikoff (2002) with our 
definition of generational accounts. We find that the magnitude of the bias is similar to 
the one obtained in the numerical simulations. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we briefly 
summarize the methodology of generational accounting and its applications. In section 3, 
we prove our main result in the context of a dynamic general equilibrium model. In 
section 4, we develop a quantitative policy reform to illustrate the discrepancies in 
generational accounts, and then provide an empirical illustration for the U.S. economy. In 
section 5, we summarize the findings and provide our conclusions. 
  5 
2. GENERATIONAL ACCOUNTING 
The generational accounting framework was developed by Auerbach, Gokhale, 
and Kotlikoff (1991) with the objective of measuring the generational incidence of tax 
policy independent of fiscal taxonomy labels (see Kotlikoff, 1992, 2001, for a full 
description of the methodology). The approach compares the lifetime (net of transfers) 
tax bills between present and future cohorts;, this approach is regularly used to measure 
the generational impact of changes in fiscal policy. All the different tax burden measures 
can be compared independent of the method used to calculate fiscal deficits. An 
important aspect of generational accounting is the impact of the evolution of population 
demographics in the government budget constraint and the measurement of generational 
imbalances. The ultimate goal is to prescribe tax policies that could correct any 
imbalance, so all generations bear a similar tax burden.
4 
Methodology 
We closely follow Kotlikoff’s (2001) description of the methodology of 
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4 A similar concept called equal burden-sharing is used by Bernanke (2006). This concept is interpreted to 
mean that the current generation and all future generations experience the same percentage reduction in per 
capita consumption. 
 
  6where  , s k TAX  is taxes net of transfers paid at time t by the cohort born in period  ,  k R  is 
a discount factor,  , / , s kt k π π  denotes the fraction of individuals surviving at time  , and  d 
represents the life expectancy of a cohort. 
s
Therefore, equation (1) represents the present value of the average amount of 
taxes paid by the survivors of cohort members born at time . The tax term includes total 
taxes paid minus transfer payments of different forms. If we are calculating the 
generational account implied by a model, all these elements are clearly specified. 
However, if we are using data as input, the process is a bit more involved (Auerbach, 
Kotlikoff, and Gokhale, 2001, provide a detailed description of how to map the data into 
the generational accounts), because it includes expenditures in health care, education, and 
other forms of transfer programs. However, it does not impute to any specific cohort the 
value of government expenditure in goods and services. The main reason for this 




The government intertemporal budget constraint can then be reinterpreted in 
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where  , tk μ  denotes the measure of individuals in period t of cohorts born at time k . The 
term gat,t-s represents the per capita generational account in period t for a generation born 
in period t-s. The first term on the left-hand side of equation (2) captures the existing 
                                                 
5 By contrast, welfare analysis can measure the benefits of government purchases when they enter in the 
production function or in the utility function in the form of public goods. 
 
  7cohorts, whereas the second term adds the generational accounts of unborn cohorts 
discounted at a rateR . The term on the right-hand side represents the amount of 
outstanding government debt  t B  (financial liabilities minus the sum of the government’s 
financial assets and market value of public enterprises) and the value of present and 
future government expenditures. The term Gt+s represents the level of government 
expenditure in period t+s. 
The choice of the discount rate R  merits special attention because it influences 
the generational accounts for present and future generations. The choice becomes even 
more problematic in the presence of varying rates or uncertainty because it would require 
the use of the term structure or the use of some specific stochastic discount factor to 
adjust for risk. Moreover, in the presence of incomplete markets, risk adjustment should 
be cohort specific. However, in standard practice a benchmark constant discount rate is 
used to represent the results under alternative constant discount rates. Assuming a 
constant discount rate can be restrictive because the capital-to-output ratio that ultimately 
determines interest rates may vary in the presence of demographic shocks, or due to 
different policy regimes. 
Generational Accounts Imbalances 
Given the tax burden for the current generations and the sequence of future 
expenditures, it is possible to calculate as a residual the tax payments of future 
generations. In the presence of imbalances it is possible to compute which policy changes 
(and paid by which generation) are necessary to restore sustainability. 
Another important element is the impact of demographic changes on the 
imbalance of generational accounts. Consequently, population growth of future 
  8generations can reduce imbalances, whereas population aging can exacerbate a larger tax 
burden on currently young or future cohorts. 
Generational accounts are used extensively in the literature to measure fiscal 
imbalances associated with various tax reforms. For example Gokhale, et al., (2000) 
analyze the U.S. use of the long-term projections of the Congressional Budget Office. 
These authors use a 4 percent discount rate and 2.2 percent of productivity growth and 
find that future generations will face a lifetime burden that is 41.6 percent higher than the 
existing generations. They propose five alternative policies. The first is a 31 percent 
permanent increase in federal and personal corporate income taxes. The second is a 12 
percent raise of all federal, state, and local taxes. The third policy requires cutting all 
transfers programs (Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid, food stamps, unemployment 
insurance benefits, housing support, and so on) by 21.9 percent. The final two options 
require the reduction of all government expenditures by 21 percent or federal 
expenditures by 66.3 percent. Other applications include a switch from income to 
consumption taxation (as in Altig et al., 2001), or Social Security privatization (as in 
Kotlikoff, Smetters, and Walliser, 2001). The methodology has also been applied to other 
countries such as the United Kingdom (as in Cardarelli, Kotlikoff, and Sefton, 2000). For 
an international study, see Kotlikoff and Raffelheuschen, (1991). 
3. THE MEASUREMENT OF TAX INCIDENCE 
This section begins with two examples in a simple framework. Each example 
considers standard policy reforms suggested in the literature, such as redistributive 
policy, or the substitution of consumption taxes by income taxes. We show that these 
alternative fiscal policies could generate the same household allocation and welfare, but 
  9give rise to different measures of tax incidence using the standard generational 
accounting procedure. We then develop this argument more formally using a fairly 
general overlapping generations model with production. The model illustrates how the 
generational accounts can be biased because they are not robust to the choice of tax 
instruments. The model can also be used to derive an alternative tax burden measurement 
based on the consumer intertemporal budget constraint. This new measure is equally 
simple in its implementation and is robust to the choice of tax instruments. We describe 
these steps in detail. 
Examples 
Consider a two-period environment in which the households solve a simple 
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where   denote consumption,  12 , cc 12 , ω ω  are the endowments, and   is the asset level.  2 a
Because the purpose of the example is to measure the tax burden, we consider 
specific values for the parameters. In particular, the discount factor is  0.5 β =
12
, the 
interest rate is  , and individuals have an income endowment of  2 r = 100 ω ω ==  units 
of the consumption good. The tax policy is entirely characterized by a capital income tax 
of 0.5 k τ = . 
Given the parameter values, it is simple to check that the optimal solution implies: 
 and  . Therefore, taxes paid are 0, and the present value of net taxes 
paid is also 0. 
12 100 cc == 2 0 a =
  10Example 1. Reallocation of resources over the life cycle. A usual example in 
the literature involves changes in the distribution of resources over time such as Social 
Security privatization (e.g., Kotlikoff, Smetters, and Walliser, 2001). Consider a policy 
where households receive a transfer in period 1 of  1 50 TR =   and they face a tax of 
 units in period 2. The capital income tax is kept at 50%.  2 100 T =
The reallocation of resources over the life cycle does not alter the households’ 
intertemporal budget constraint, as shown below: 
(4)  [] 12 1 1
11
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or 
(5)  12 0.5 150 cc + ≤ . 
Now, the optimal consumption allocations remains the same ( 12 100 cc = = ), but the 
optimal level of savings is . What is the present value of taxes net of transfers?  2 50 a =










=− + + =
+−
2 . 
The implementation of a tax policy that reallocates resources over the life cycle 
has no effect on consumer welfare because the intertemporal allocation of consumption 
has not changed. However, the generational accounts show that the households are 
paying more taxes. 
Alternatively, if we redistribute in the other direction, from young to old (i.e., 
Social Security), we could implement a tax  1 50 T =  in period 1, and a transfer   
in period 2. Since the intertemporal budget constraint does not change, the optimal 
consumption allocations is the samecc
2 100 TR =
12 100 = = , but now consumers borrow  .  2 50 a =−
  11Now the implied generational account measuring the present value of taxes net of 
transfers becomes: 














Not surprisingly, the generational accounting methods show households paying 
fewer taxes. 
This example illustrates a Pareto-neutral Social Security reform that redistributes 
resources across time. Conesa and Garriga (2008a) show that this neutrality holds even in 
the presence of labor supply distortions. 
Example 2. Substitute consumption taxes for capital taxes. Another typical 
example in this literature is the substitution of tax instruments (see Altig et al., 2001). 
Consider a policy where households receive a transfer in period 1 of  , they face a 
consumption tax in period 2 of 
1 10 TR =
,2 0.25 c τ = , and the capital income tax is lowered to 
0.25 k τ = . 
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12 0.5 150 cc + ≤ . 
The optimal consumption allocations remains the same, ( 12 100 cc = = ), but the 
implied level of savings is now  21 1 1 10 aT R c ω = +− = . The change in capital income 
taxation affects the discount rate used to compute the generational accounts over time. 
  12The present value of taxes net of transfers, discounted by the new after-tax interest rate, 
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⎡⎤ =− + + = ⎣⎦ +−
2 . 
Again, consumption—and hence, welfare—do not change, but the tax burden, as 
measured by generational accounting, increases. 
Notably, all of these examples share two common features: alternative fiscal 
policies redistribute taxes/transfers over the life cycle, and households respond optimally 
by changing their level of savings. Because the return on savings is taxed, redistribution 
of the tax burden over the life cycle changes the present value of taxes paid. If, on the 
contrary, we were to exclude capital income taxes from our calculation of the tax burden, 
we could immediately see that generational accounting would not change in any of these 
examples. Now we establish these results in a more general setup. 
A Standard Life Cycle Model 
Generations live for I  periods. Preferences of an individual born in period t are 
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where   and   denote consumption and hours worked of individuals of age  , jt c , jt l j  at time 
. An individual’s subjective discount rate is denoted by t β . The utility function is 
assumed to be twice continuously differentiable, strictly concave, monotonically 
  13increasing in consumption and leisure, and satisfies the standard Inada conditions. At 
each time point households are endowed with one divisible unit of time that can be used 
for work and leisure. One unit of time of a household of age i transforms into  i ε  units of 
labor input. The time-invariant endowment profile of efficiency units of labor over the 




Individuals supply their labor services and assets in competitive markets. Then, 
individuals receive a competitive wage, , per efficiency unit of labor supplied in period 
. They also hold assets, , in the form of physical capital or government bonds in 
exchange for a market rental rate,  . Clearly, the return of both investments must be the 
same if households are to hold both types of assets. We denote the transfer payments 
received by cohort 
t w
t
j as . Notice that this allows transfers to change over the life 
cycle.
, jt m
, ) t t L
                  
6 
We assume that markets are complete. Therefore, households are allowed to trade 
assets to smooth consumption over the life cycle. Two potential extensions from the 
standard model are possible: (i) the introduction of intragenerational heterogeneity, and 
(ii) the introduction of mortality risk with or without annuity markets. The findings in this 
paper do not depend on either of these model features. 
The production possibility frontier is represented by a constant returns to scale 
technology,  YF , that transforms units of capital   and efficiency units of  ( t K = t K
                                
6 We are not restricting the sign of government transfer programs for workers and retirees. This is not 
relevant since the focus of the paper is the measurement of tax incidence over different cohorts, not the 
distortionary effect of different tax instruments on these individuals. 
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=
=∑ , into value added. The production function is assumed to satisfy 
the standard Inada conditions. There is no technological progress, and capital depreciates 
at a constant rateδ . We consider a single representative firm that operates the aggregate 
technology, taking factor prices   as given.  , tt wr
,, it it cK
t t L τ ++ ∑∑
Each period production can be used for private consumption, investment, and 
nonproductive government expenditure.
7 We will take the sequence of government 
consumption to be exogenously specified. The period resource constraint is then 
expressed as: 
(12)  . 
1
1
(1 ) ( , )
I
t t t t t
i
K G F K L μδ +
=
+− − + = ∑
The government at each period collects consumption taxes, labor income taxes, capital 
income taxes, and one-period bonds to finance government expenditure and transfer 
programs. Thus, the period government budget constraint is given by  
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Definition 1. Given a government policy, a market equilibrium in the economy is 
a sequence of allocations and prices such that (i) consumers maximize utility subject to 
their budget constraints, (ii) firms maximize profits, (iii) the government budget 
constraint is balanced, and, (iv) markets clear and feasibility. 
 
 
                                                 
7 We choose to have a non-productive government expenditure to have a comparable benchmark with the 
generational accounting methodology. 
 
 
  15Model Generational Accounts 
To construct the generational accounts for each cohort, we must determine the net 
tax outlets (taxes minus transfers properly discounted) for each generation. In our model 
environment the generational accounting of every newborn generation is given by 
(14) 
1
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There is also an equivalent expression for the cohorts already born. The generational 
accounts are not a total lifetime bill, but, rather, remaining lifetime bills. As a 
consequence the accounts are positive for young and middle age cohorts, but negative for 
older cohorts. 
In contrast with the empirical applications, the theoretical model offers a natural discount 
rate because the market clearing interest rate can be used.
8 However, it is important to 
remark that individual generational accounts are just a metric to measure tax incidence 
and are not necessarily related to the equilibrium in the model. In equilibrium, the 
government intertemporal budget constraint is always satisfied. However, the implied 
individual generational accounts and imbalances need not be consistent with the 
government budget constraint unless the market discount rate is used. We simply use the 
model to generate data that then are used to measure tax incidence by constructing 
generational accounts. 
                                                 
8 Consequently, the long-run effects of demographic shocks or policy changes will affect future discount 
rates through changes in the capital-to-output ratio. This efficiency effect is usually not captured when the 
generational accounts are computed directly from the data, and the discount rate is fixed. 
 
 
  164. BIAS IN THE MEASUREMENT OF TAX INCIDENCE WITH STANDARD 
GENERATIONAL ACCOUNTING 
To illustrate the measurement bias of the tax incidence implied by the 
generational accounts, it is useful to state and prove a well-known equivalence result. We 
then use this equivalence to show that the generational accounting measurements are not 
identical across equivalent tax policies. 
Proposition 1. Let   be a feasible fiscal policy, and let { ˆ ˆˆ (, , ) mB τ } ,,1 ˆ ˆ ˆ (,) ,
I
it it i t cl K =  be 
the resulting allocation. Then, there exists a fiscal policy (  and a distribution of 
assets   such that {
, , ) mB τ % %%
, ()
I
it i a = % 1 } ,,1 ˆ ˆ (,) ,
I
it it i cl = ˆ
t K
) , τ%%
 is the equilibrium allocation corresponding to 
. Moreover, the associated generational accounts would in general differ 
between policy   and policy ( . 
(, τ%% , ) mB %
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Clearly, more than one policy can implement the same allocation because there are 2*I  
equations and 4*I  fiscal variables to determine a given an allocation. 
Given an alternative fiscal policy, assets can then be constructed directly from the 
sequential budget constraints. Notice that aggregate wealth would then change, and as a 
  17consequence, government debt changes because the aggregate capital stock is unchanged. 
Finally, the new level of government debt must necessarily balance the government 
budget constraint by Walras’ law. 
In general, the associated generational accounts measurement would change, even 
though allocations and welfare are the same. To see that the generational accounts must 





ts ts ts ts ts











+= + ∑∑ ∑
=
1,2,... t ,  = . 
Notice that because aggregate debt in general changes across equivalent policies, the 
right-hand side of the equation must change for some  . Therefore, the left-hand side 
must change as well.■ 
t
This result has two important implications.
9 From the positive point of view, the 
measurement of tax incidence implied by generational accounts does not provide an 
accurate description (or invariant metric) of generational imbalances of the effective tax 
burden faced by different cohorts. From a normative point of view, the evaluation of tax 
policies based on the distribution of tax burden for different age cohorts could be 
misleading of the true cost for each cohort. Our results show that we could be evaluating 
the implied tax incidence of different policies on different cohorts and using the 
generational accounts to conclude that one policy performs better than another. 
Nevertheless, these policies could be equivalent from the household perspective, but the 
                                                 
9 A few remarks are relevant to the proposition. First, notice that the different tax reforms consistent with 
the proposition might imply a change in statutory tax rates (with the same effective tax wedges), a change 
in the magnitudes of intergenerational transfers, or both. Second, the result still holds in the presence of 
borrowing constraint of some form. The proof is very general and holds in a larger class of economies that 
include uncertainty and certain forms of market frictions. It is sufficient to have a non-empty set of 
equivalent policies. 
 
  18generational accounts would lead to a different conclusion. This should be clear from the 
examples in Section 3 that show the influence of tax reform in generational accounts 
imbalances. 
 
Correcting the Bias in Generational Accounting 
A major problem in using generational accounts to measure generational 
imbalances is the tax treatment of savings. The main result from Proposition 1 states that 
any equivalent tax policy that requires a different distribution of asset holdings that 
include claims on capital and government debt will lead to different generational 
accounts. 
One way to avoid this problem is to measure tax incidence using the intertemporal 
budget constraint and effective rather than nominal tax distortions. The idea is very 
simple: If the tax policies are equivalent, the intertemporal budget constraints must be the 
same; otherwise, consumption-leisure plans would differ. Given this condition, then, we 
should measure the magnitude of all the effective taxes paid using the consolidated 
budget constraint and not what is recorded in the government accounting books. This 
alternative procedure can be described as follows. Consider the sequential budget 
constraint: 
(15)  . 
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() ()
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  19Newborn households’ intertemporal budget constraint can be written as follows: 
(16)  ()
,1






t i it i t i t i t i iit i c
ii ti
m
qc q w l φε
τ
+−
+− +− +− +− +− +−
== +−
⎡ ⎤
=− + ⎢ ⎥ + ⎣ ⎦ ∑∑ %% . 
Notice that the difference between the market value of labor income and consumption, 
valued at the effective price of consumption goods, is denoted as: 
(17)  ()
,1
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Undoing the transformation of variables in the right-hand side of equation 17, we arrive 
at our proposal for measuring tax incidence across cohorts: 
(18)  ()
1
11 1 , 1 ,
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Notice that two equivalent policies must satisfy the following first-order conditions (and 

































−= − . 
It is then clear that equivalent policies should therefore generate the same fiscal burden as 
measured by equation (18), because the relative price of consumption across periods, the 
effective taxation of the consumption-leisure margin, and the effective present value of 
transfers must be the same across equivalent policies. 
Thus, we have provided an alternative measurement of tax incidence that is robust 
to the choice of tax instruments to decentralize a given allocation. Moreover, it is even 
  20simpler in practice, as shown in the following direct comparison (equation 21) between 
our proposal and the standard procedure (equation 22): 
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Notice that the same procedure could be used for currently existing cohorts. The 
only difference is that for these cohorts the taxation of currently existing wealth holdings 
should be included as effective taxation, while this is not the case for newborns born with 
zero assets.  
5. QUANTITATIVE ASSESSMENT OF THE TAX INCIDENCE BIAS 
In this section we measure the potential size of the tax incidence bias and compare 
it to with our proposed robust measure. In general, it is difficult to characterize the 
equilibrium path and the optimal decision rules for a given tax policy. In the absence of a 
closed-form solution, we use numerical methods to simulate the policy reforms and 
compute the implied generational accounts. 
As an illustration, we perform a Pareto-neutral Social Security privatization that 
transforms the unfunded system into a funded one with private accounts following 
Conesa and Garriga (2008a). The tax incidence bias can be measured as the difference 
between the implied generational accounts across Social Security regimes and by 
comparing the magnitudes with the robust measure. 
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Next we determine the choice of functional forms and parameters for the model 
simulation. 
Functional forms. We pose a standard log utility function between consumption 
and leisure: 
(24) ( , ) ln (1 )ln(1 ) ucl c l γ γ = +− −, 
where γ  represents the consumption share on the utility function. 
The aggregate technology is Cobb-Douglas with constant returns to scale:  
(25) 
1 (,) FKL KL
α α − = , 
where α  represents the capital income share in output. We assume that capital 
depreciates at a constant rate δ  and there is no exogenous technological growth. 
Population structure and income. A model period is equivalent to one year. 
Given our period choice, we assume households live for 65 periods, so that the 
economically active life of a household starts at age 20 and we assume that households 
die with certainty at age 85. In the benchmark economy, households retire in period 45 
(equivalent to age 65 in years). Finally, we normalize the mass of households to be 1. We 
assume that households are endowed with one unit of time. The lifetime profile of 
efficiency units is constructed using Current Population Survey (CPS) data. 
 Government policy. The level of government expenditure is exogenously 
specified as 20 percent of output. Revenues come from two sources: (i) capital and labor 
income taxes and (ii) consumption taxes. In addition, the government runs a pay-as-you-
go Social Security system in the benchmark policy scenario. We assume that the tax on 
capital income is 33 percent, Social Security contributions are 10.5 percent, and 
  22consumption taxes are 5 percent. The labor income tax is chosen to balance the 
government budget given the target level of outstanding government debt. 
Given the assumptions on the functional forms, endowments, and tax rates, we 
jointly solve for the equilibrium and the parameterization using the minimum distance 
method. Table 1 defines the parameter values and the targets. 
We want our economy to match three empirical targets. First, we define aggregate 
capital as the level of fixed assets in the Bureau of Economic Analysis statistics, giving 
an implied capital-to-output ratio of 3.00. Our second target is the average number of 
hours worked over the life cycle, with an average of one-third of the time of households 
allocated to market activities. The third target is an investment-to-output ratio of 16 
percent. In addition, we fix government debt (defined as federal, state, and local) with an 
implied ratio to GDP of 0.50, and the ratio of government expenditure to GDP at 0.20. 
Our three targets determine the value of three parameters: the discount factor, the 
consumption share in the utility function, and the depreciation rate. In addition, the labor 
income tax is endogenously determined from the government’s budget constraint given 
the ratios of government debt and expenditure to GDP. 
A Pareto-Neutral Social Security Reform 
The fiscal reform we examine follows Conesa and Garriga (2008a), and it 
illustrates the measurement discrepancies generated by the standard procedure of 
generational accounting. The goal is to implement a privatization of the Social Security 
system while maintaining the level of distortions from the baseline economy.
10 The 
timing of events works as follows. We assume that at time 1 the economy is in steady 
                                                 
10 Clearly, it is possible to achieve better policy results optimizing distortions as in Conesa and Garriga 
(2008a) that use optimal fiscal policy to do precisely that. 
  23state with an unfunded Social Security system. The contributions made by the young 
generate an entitlement to a future benefit retirement, which constitutes an implicit debt 
of the Social Security Administration towards them. On retirement, these retirees receive 
their claims. 
The reform is implemented at  2 t = . The government eliminates pensions, giving 
compensatory transfers to all households. These household-specific transfers are financed 
with government debt. The privatization effectively transforms the implicit debt of the 
Social Security system into explicit debt, but real allocations and welfare remain 
unchanged. The resulting distribution of wealth is different, since now Social Security 
implicit claims are transformed into explicit assets in the hands of households. Figure 1 
compares both distributions of wealth. 
The asset distribution under the funded system is always above the unfunded one, 
since now workers use the proceedings from Social Security contributions to invest in 
private savings accounts. The youngest cohort receives as a transfer an initial level of 
assets that is equivalent to the net present value of Social Security transfers. This number 
ensures that the consumer intertemporal budget constraint is satisfied. The difference 
between the newly issued government bonds and the initial outstanding government debt 
determines the implicit debt of the Social Security system. Figure 2 represents the net 
taxes paid over the life cycle in these two equivalent policy regimes. 
Under the unfunded Social Security system, the entire tax burden is placed on 
individuals age 65 and younger. Retired households pay consumption and capital income 
taxes, but in net terms they receive resources (their pensions). Under the new regime, 
retired households do not receive a transfer from the government, and they are fully taxed 
  24for the interest earned in the retirement accounts. Despite the differences in the amount of 
taxes paid, the welfare distribution is the same across tax regimes. Using the net taxes 
paid and the relative size of each cohort, we can compute the generational accounts of 
each cohort based on their age. Figure 3 summarizes the model implied generational 
accounts for these two equivalent Social Security regimes using the standard approach. 
Notice that the standard generational accounting procedure is not invariant 
between these two equivalent policy regimes because the two top curves in Figure 3 do 
not lie on top of each other. To the contrary, the implied values have a bias that can be as 
high as 15 percent for the young and middle-aged cohorts. The bias is driven purely by 
the fact that government bond holdings are larger in the funded regime, while they are not 
net wealth. Because capital income (coming from holding government debt or financial 
assets) is taxed, the imputed tax burden varies across the two policy regimes. However, 
the proceedings from selling the government bonds are by construction equal to the 
transfers received from the Social Security system. The distinction is that under the 
equivalent policy, transfers are computed as a taxable asset and a liability for the 
government that remains forever, whereas in the other case as a net transfer from the 
government and funded by workers’ contributions (but an implicit liability for the 
government). Next, we compare this standard measurement with our proposed robust 
measure for generational accounts. 
The generational accounting procedure we propose is based on the intertemporal 
households’ budget constraint and therefore accounts only for the tax treatment of capital 
and consumption insofar as they affect the relative price of consumption across time. 
Also, the measure only considers the effective distortion in the labor supply net of the 
  25government transfers received in the corresponding period. As a consequence, the new 
measure predicts a lower tax burden for all households except households in their last 
period. 
Notice the large bias of the previous two generational accounts (GA) (“GA 
Funded” and “GA Unfunded”) compared with the proposed generational accounting 
metric based on the intertemporal budget constraint. We claim that our proposed new 
metric is not only robust to the choice of tax instruments, but it is also easier to calculate 
because it requires less information. 
An Empirical Illustration 
The previous results were illustrations with data generated from a model. Now we 
complete the analysis by comparing the measurement of tax incidence according to our 
proposed procedure with the measurement by Kotlikoff (2002, table 1). Kotlikof’s table 
reports the generational accounts of males in the United States in 1998, measured in 
thousands of dollars, under the assumptions of a 4% discount rate and a 2.2% growth 
rate. 
Figure 4 illustrates the quantitative difference between the original methodology 
and our proposal. We use the numbers reported in Kotlikoff’s table 1 (2002) to construct 
our alternative measure. We subtract the capital income taxes that all cohorts would have 
to pay in the future and include only the taxation of initial wealth holdings. A simple 
comparison shows that the effective taxation of the existing cohorts in 1998 is much 
lower than with the traditional methodology. The results are very consistent with the 
findings implied by the model. In particular, the model and the data estimates suggest that 
the zero crossing point should be delayed 10 years. 
  265. CONCLUSION 
The current financial crisis is taking a huge toll on government deficits. In 
addition, current estimates anticipate that in 25 years the U.S. economy will have twice as 
many retirees but only 20 percent more workers. This demographic transition surely will 
have an important effect on the government budget unless the benefits from Social 
Security and Medicare are reduced. The determination of which cohorts will bear the cost 
is important, but first agreement on how to measure generational imbalances is needed. 
We show that the standard generational accounting procedure yields an inaccurate 
measurement of tax burden imbalances across cohorts. We find that it is possible to 
construct tax policy reforms consistent with the same pattern of consumption, work 
effort, and utility across generations, but yielding different tax burden measurements than 
those obtained with generational accounting. This result is very important for policy 
evaluation because it shows that the selection of tax policies based on generational 
accounts can be biased. We quantify the potential bias introduced by the methodology at 
the same time that we provide a robust alternative, equally simple in its implementation. 
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  33Table 1. Parameterization of the Economy 
 
Statistic Target  Result 
Wealth to GDP ratio  3.00  3.00 
Investment to GDP  0.16  0.16 
Average Hours Worked  0.33  0.33 
Debt to GDP  0.50  0.50 
Government Expenditure to GDP  0.20  0.20 
Variable Parameter  Value 
Discount factor  β   0.984 
Consumption share  γ   0.460 
Depreciation rate  δ   0.041 
Labor income tax   l τ   0.169 
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